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ABSTRACT

Among the questions which this paper addresses are, how does a
culture of corruption perpetuate itself over time, what effects do dif
ferent features of the economy have on the phenomenon of corruption, and
why the culture of corruption might or might not alter over time?
A central feature of the present dynamic analysis is that rational
individuals (citizens as wel 1 as burea.ucrats) learn from their past ex
periences. The past economic environment thus affects the current choices
of individuals which, in turn, influence the future economic enviroD111ent.
As a result, if bureaucratic corruption has been more pervasive in the
past, then different citizens are more likely to choose those behaviors
(such as more extensive cheating) which induce a greater pervasiveness of
corruption in the future.

These inter-temporal behavioral externalities

are formalized within an overlapping generations framework, and the re
sulting aggregate corruption and cheating is characterized and analyzed.
This positive analysis yields new perspectives as well as new re
sults.

I examine ho,, the pervasiveness of corruption and cheating is

altered by such features of the economy as the extent of government in
tervention, and the beliefs of the youngest generations.

Among the

results is that if youngest generations of citizens believe that corrup
tion is more pervasive, then corruption actually becomes more pervasive.

PERSISTENCE AND PERVASIVENESS OF CORRUPTION:
NEW PERSPECTIVES
Raaj Kumar Sah, Yale Univers ity

I.

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of bureauc ratic corrupti on is sufficie ntly pervasiv e
in developi ng economie s that it has not escaped the attentio n of any ex
cept the most casual observe rs of these economi es.

No matter what the

nature of a transact ion between the governm ent and a member of the public
might be (for example, whether the transact ion involves paying taxes, re
ceiving social benefits , or protecti ng one's property rights of one kind
or another ), it is the case more often than not that the transact ion en
tails some degree of corrupti on and illegali ty.
might go deeper than that.

In fact, the problem

To the extent that changes are occurrin g in

many of these societie s (for instance , new product ion and organiz ation
activiti es undertak en by private individu als and the governm ent), the
nature of change itself seems to be guided by the logic and culture of
corrupti on.
Some developm ent economi sts have also recogniz ed the central role
that corrupti on (and associat ed features such as bureauc ratic ineptnes s,
apathy and abusiven ess) can play in determin ing the generati on and dis
1
tributio n of real incomes in LDCs.

In fact, it has often been argued

that the oft-obse rved failures of developm ent projects and policies dur
ing the last three decades have been caused in large part by the fact
l
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that most of these projects and policies were formulat ed and evaluate d
within paradigm s which abstract ed from the phenomenon of corrupti on.
The kinds of question s which the present paper addresse s are, how
does a culture of corrupti on perpetua te itself over time, what effects do
differen t features of the economy have on the phenomenon of corrupti on,
and why might the culture of corrupti on alter or not alter over time?
These question s are fundame ntal to an understa ndina of the economic en
vironme nt in many LDCs, and our analysis of the question s yields a number
of qualitat ive results as well as new perspec tives.
A central element of our analysis consists of the followin g kinds of
"dynamic behavio ral externa lities" which rational individu als exert on
one another.

An individ ual's choice of current behavio r is in part based

on his past experien ces.

This is because the current choice of an indi

vidual must necessa rily be based on what his beliefs are concerni ng the
nature of economic environm ent, and these beliefs are influenc ed by his
past experien ces.

In turn, the current behavio ral choices of differen t

individu als influenc e the current experien ces and, hence, the future
behavio r of other individu als in the economy.

For instance , if the past

experien ces of the members of the public (who, for brevity, are referred
as "citizen s") have convince d them that bureauc ratic corrupti on is per
vasive in the economy, then these individu als are more likely to under
take those activiti es which are more benefic ial to them in the presence
of pervasiv e corrupti on

(I use the short-ha nd expressi on "cheatin J" to

refer to such activiti es).

Such choices made by the citizens , in turn,

make it more likely that the bureauc rats would find it desirabl e to adopt
those kinds of behavio rs which sustain a high level of corrupti on in the
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future.

In this sense. a greater prevalence of corruption in the past

induces a greater prevalence of corruption in the future. 2
A natural framework within which to analyze the above dynamics is
the overlapping generations model. because it provides an explicit basis
to link the behaviors of different generations of individuals.

Thus. in

our analysis. each cohort lives for a finite length of time, and the be
havior of the members of each generation influences (and is influenced
by) the behavior of the members of other--older as well as younger-
generations which are living contemporaneou sly.

Another key advantage of

this framework is that it allows significant differences in the beliefs
(and hence in the behavioral choices) of similar individuals.

For in

stance. two citizens may believe quite differently (one may believe that
there is extensive corruption, while the other believes that corruption
is negligible) if their past experiences are different, even though they
belong to the same generation. face the same economic trade-offs. and
have started their lives with the same initial beliefs.

This implication

of the model is consistent with the diversity in individuals' beliefs
which has often been observed.3
The analysis developed in this paper is positive.

It takes as given

the legal and administrative structure which influences individuals' in
centives.

The relevant aspects of the legal and administrative structure

are represented in our model through exogenous parameters, and the ef
fects of changes in these parameters (or, alternatively, the consequences
of differences in these parameters between two econcaies) are traced on
the behaviors of different individuals as well as on the aggregate eco
nomic environment.

The paper does not deal with the normative question
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of how a society should set its legal and administrative structure.
A related aspect which is noteworthy is that our analysis is robust
to aany of the details of the legal and administrative structure.

For

instance, what is relevant for our model of a bureaucrat's choice is a
simple property that it .is

■ore

attractive for an individual bureaucrat

to be corrupt (or to be corrupt to a greater e%tent) if there is a great
er prevalence of cheating aaong the citizens who have to deal with hia.
This intuitive property would be satisfied in a variety of conte%ts (for
instance, whether the corruption is in the conte%t of public procurement
or in the conte%t of ta% collection), under a variety of bureaucratic
structures (for instance, how a bureaucrat is policed and whether those
responsible for policing are themselves potential participants in corrup
tion), for a variety of mechanisms through which a bureaucrat might de
tect cheating among citizens (which includes the trade-off between the
effort spent by the bureaucrat and the probability of his being able to
detect a cheating citizen), and under a variety of'.rnard and punishment
schedules4 (for instance, the amounts and types of bribes involved, and
the punishment associated with the conviction of a corrupt bureaucrat 5 ).
Since the present paper treads on ground which is relatively une%
plored, I have used several

1i ■plifyin1

ass1111ptions to bring out what

appear to ae to be 1oae of the novel aspects of the analysis.

The basic

model is developed in Section II, and it is analyzed in Section III.
Section 'IV, I show how the
be modified.

1i■ plifying

a111111ption of the basic

■odel

Concluding r•arks hiahlighting 1oae of the central

features of the analysis are presented at the end.

In
can

s
II.

TIIE BASIC MODEL

In each period a new cohort of bureaucrats and citizens enters the
economy.

The life span of an individual is T periods, where T

12.

Individuals begin their lives with diverse beliefs concerning the rele
vant features of the economic environment (the relevant features for a
bureaucrat and a citizen respectively are the extent to which cheating
and corruption are prevalent in the economy),6 and revise their beliefs
based on their experiences as they progress through life.

I begin the

analysis with the following simple specification.
In each period a citizen encounters one bureaucrat, and a bureaucrat
encounters a certain number of citizens (this number is denoted at pres
ent by the parameter M).

Individuals face binary choices in each period:

a bureaucrat's choices are to be corrupt or not corrupt, and a citizen's
choices are to cheat or not cheat.

The actual participants of different

encounters are determined randomly; that is, there is an equal probabil
ity that a citizen might encounter any one of the large number of bureau
crats in the economy, and there is an equal probability that one of the
even larger number of citizens in the economy may belong to the subset of
individuals whom a bureaucrat encounters within a particular period.

An

individual must make his behavioral choice before the actual encounter;
the choice is therefore determined in part by the individual's beliefs
and past experiences.
The description and analysis of the choices of a citizen and a bur
eaucrat is presented in the next three subsections.

This is followed by

a characterization of a societal equilibrium in corruption and cheating.

6

A.

A Citizen's Choices

For a citizen who chooses to cheat in a particular period, the (ex
pected) utility is u00 if he encounters a corrupt bureaucrat, and the
utility is u01 if he encounters a bureaucrat who is not corrupt.

The

corresponding util_ities for a citizen who chooses not to cheat are u10
and u11 •

I assume that u00

> u 10 •

and u11

> u01 •

That is. cheating is

more profitable for a citizen if he were to encounter a corrupt bureau
crat, and not cheating is more profitable othenise.7

By making this

assmaption, I also abstract from thos·e cases where a citizen's choice is
trivial in the sense that it is entirely unaffected by what his beliefs
are.
The choice of

a

citizen in each period depends therefore on what his

mean estimate of the "level of corruption" (that is, the proportion of

corrupt bureaucrats out of the total population of bureaucrats) is, be
cause this estimate represents the probability which this citizen asso
ciates with the event of encountering a corrupt bureaucrat.
ect, s(t),

a)

Let

denote this estimate for a citizen who has lived for t

periods, who has encountered s(t) corrupt bureaucrats during the past t
periods (obviously. t
by the vector a.

l

s(t) 10), and whose characteristics are denoted

It follows then that this citizen will choose to cheat

in the (t + l)st period of his life if and only if8

(1)

"C (t.

s(t). a)

l

u.

u can be viewed as the "relative cost of cheating" because it is increas

ing in u11 and u10 • and it is decreasing in u01 and u00 •

Also. our
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assumptions concerning the pay-offs imply that 1

> u > O.

~

The estimate C is in general increasing in s(t).

This is because if

a citizen has encountered a larger number of corrupt bureaucrats in the

past, then his current estimate of the level of corruption must be larg
er.

The criterion (1) thus can be reexpressed as:
s<t> l r(t, u, a>,

(2)

where r is defined implicitly by the equation C(t, r, a)= u.
nomic meaning of (2) is transparent.

The eco

A citizen chooses to cheat in a

particular period of his life if the number of his past encounters with
corrupt bureaucrats exceeds his "reservation level." r, for that period.
The above description of

a

citizen's choices does not depend in any

way on what his initial beliefs are,

To make the analysis more tract

able, however, I shall assume that the initial beliefs of a citizen can
be represented by a beta distribution with parameters
a= (a 1

> 0,

a2

> 0).

This assU111ption is not specially restrictive be

cause other types of initial beliefs can be approximated to a reasonable
degree by a beta distribution with appropriately chosen parameters.

The

assumption of beta initial beliefs yields the following simple expression
for

C. 9
al+ S(t)

A

(3)

C( t. s ( t ) • al. a2 ) =

al + a2 + t

The initial estimate of the level of corruption (that is, the estimate
with which a citizen begins his life) is obtained by substituting
s(t)

=t =0

into (3).

This yields

8
( 4)

The effect of parameter s Ca1, a2 ), which play an important role in later
analysis, can be seen froa (4).

-i

A citizen with a larger a or a smaller
1

believes in the ·beginning of ~is life that the level of corruptio n in

the economy is higher.
The main advantage of the above ass11111ption concernin g the functiona l
form of initial beliefs is that it yields a closed-for m solution for the
reservati on level

r.

In fact, using (3) in combinati on with (1) and (2),

one obtains

To complete the model of a citizen's behavior, I make a minor modi
fication which turns out to be useful later on.
tion level,

Note that the reserva-

r, is in general not an integer, whereas the number of cor

rupt bureaucra ts a citizen has encounter ed in the past, s(t), is an
integer.

To make the two compatibl e, I define an integer version of

r;

that is,
r = [rl+

(Sb)

where the symbol [ l+ denotes the standard "rounding off" function; that
is, the function is s..e as its arauaent if the ar11111ent is an
integer, otherwise the function equals the nezt inteaer hi&her than the
argument.

For brevity, r is referred to as the "reservat ion score."

To SUIIJllarize, then, the criterion which a citizen employs for his
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choice in the (t + l)st period of his life is:
s(t) L r(t, u, a , a ),

Cheat if and only if

(6)

1

2

where r is given by (Sa) and (Sb).

B.

A Bureaucrat's Choices

For simplicity I assmne at present that if a bureaucrat is corrupt
during a particular period then his utility is linearly increasing in b
which denotes the number of citizens who have chosen to cheat among those
whom the bureaucrat encounters during that period.

The utility of a cor

rupt bureaucrat is thus denoted by uO(b} = tf>l + bUoo, where uOO is posi
tive.

Obviously,

ML b LO.

corrupt is denoted by u1 •

The utility of a bureaucrat who is not

I assume that u0(M}

> ul > uO(O}.

That is,

i

the utility of a bureaucrat who is not corrupt lies between the maximum
possible utility of a corrupt bureaucrat (which occurs when all citizens
whom he encounters have chosen to cheat) and the minimum possible utility
of a corrupt bureaucrat (which occurs when none of the citizens whom he
encounters have chosen to cheat}.lO
Since the description of a bureaucrat's choice is analogous to that
of a citizen's choice discussed earlier, I leave out the details and only
note those expressions which are relevant for later analysis.

Let

ict, S(t), Jl, A) denote the "level of cheating" in the economy (that is,
the proportion of citizens who are cheatina) as estimated by a bureaucrat
who has lived fort periods, who has found S(t) citizens to be cheating
among those whom he has encountered during the past t periods, and whose
characteristics are denoted by the vector A.

Then, this bureaucrat would

choose to be corrupt in the (t + l)st period of his life if and only if

10
(7)

~(t, S(t), M, A)

l U,

where the parameter U = (U1 -

tf> 1 )!MtJOO

corruption" because it is increasing in
and

u00 • Also, it is

apparent that 1

represents the "relative cost of

u1 and

it is decreasing in

u01

> U > 0.

If i(t, U, M, A) represents the bureaucrat's reservation level, then
(7) is equivalently represented as

(8)

S(t)

l

i(t, U, M, A).

When a bureaucrat's initial beliefs are represented by a beta distribu
tion with parameters A= (A1 > 0,

,½ > 0),

then we obtain the following

expressions which have familiar interpretations

( 9)

'c(t, S(t), M, ~• ~)

A + S(t)
1

=A

1 + ~ + tM '

(lla)

The role of parameters
a

larger

Ai

<Ai,,½)

can be seen from (10).

A bureaucrat with

or a smaller,½ believes in the beginning of his life that

the level of cheatin1 is higher in the economy.

Finally, if

Cllb)

represents the reservation score, then the behavioral choice of a bureau
crat, in the (t + l)st period of his life, is d,iemined by the criterion:

11

(12)

Be corrupt if and only if

S(t) LR(t, U, M, A , A )
1
2

where R is given by (lla) and (llb).

C.

Properties of Individuals' Behavior

The patterns of an individual's behavior predicted by the preceding
mopels are appealing.

Consider for instance a citizen who had chosen to

cheat in the last period.

Then the decision rule (6) predicts that this

citizen will also choose to cheat in the current period if he has en
countered a corrupt bureaucrat in the last period. 11

Likewise, if a

citizen had chosen not to cheat in the last period and had encoUJ1tered a
bureaucrat who is not corrupt, then he will choose not to cheat in the
current period as well.

The reason is simple.

Since an individual

chooses the most profitable behavior in every period, given his current
beliefs, he has no reason to alter his behavior in the next period if his
recent experiences have not contradicted his previously held beliefs.
Changes in the behavior of a bureaucrat between any two successive
periods can be analyzed similarly.

For instance, if a bureaucrat was

corrupt in the last period, and if most of the citizens whom he encount
ered in the last period had chosen to cheat, then this bureaucrat will be
corrupt in the current period as well.

These results are s1D11JDarized as

follows.
PROPOSITION 1.

A bureaucrat or a citizen does not alter his behavior be

tween two successive periods unless he has been "disappointed" by his ac
tual experience; that is. unless his recent experience was different fr0111
what would have been most profitable to him. given his choice of behavior
in the last period.

12
We nezt note some intuitive properties of an individual's reserva
tion score which are useful in later analysis.

The dependence of an

individual's reservation score on his age and on the relative cost of
alternative behaviors follows directly from (Sa), (Sb), (lla) and (llb):

Br/au l O ,

(13)

Br/at l O ,

U4>

aR/at l o , aBJav l o •

and

That is, an older individual can not have a smaller reservation score;
and if the relative cost of cheating (corruption) is higher, then the
reservation score of any citizen (bureaucrat) can not be aaller.
Finally, consider the effect of an individual's initial beliefs on
his reservation scores.

One would ezpect the initial beliefs to play a

more significant role in influencing an individual's choice in the earl
ier phase of his life because he has that much less experience during
this phase.

But at the same time, given our ass'Dlllption that the individ

ual's life span is finite, the initial beliefs of an individual continue
to exert a systematic effect on his reservation scores throughout his
life.

To see one such effect, consider a bureaucrat who was initially

corrupt (that is, he was corrupt in the first period of his life) and
compare him to another bureaucrat who was initially not corrupt.

Then it

is straiahtfonard to ascertain that: 12

PROPOSITION 2.

An initially corrupt bureaucrat can not have a aaller

reservation score durin1 any period of his life than the corresponding
reservation score of a bureaucrat who was not initially corrupt.
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D.

Equilibrium in Aggregate Behavior

Based on the preceding models of behavior for a bureaucrat and a
citizen, or based on other similar models, it is straightforward to
understand the evolution of the economy.

The subset of citizens who

choose to cheat in the current period are those for whom the condition
(6) is satisfied.

In turn, how large this subset is depends stochastic

ally on how prevalent bureaucratic corruption has been in the past.
Likewise, the subset of bureaucrats who choose to be corrupt in the cur
rent period are those for whom the condition (12) is satisfied, and the
size of this subset is determined by the extent to which citizens have
chosen to cheat in the past.

These two groups thus exert explicit be

havioral externalities on one another.

Therefore, given a set of initial

conditions and a set of parameters representing the economy, it is pos
sible to characterize the stochastic time-pattern of individuals' aggre
gate behavior in the economy.
I focus in this paper on analyzing steady-state equilibria in which
the level of corruption or the level of cheating does not alter from
period to period. 13

Let C and c denote respectively the steady-state

levels of corruption and cheating.

The set of equations which determine

the steady-states are derived below.
Steady-state level of cheating:

Let ct+l denote the level of cheat-

ing in the (t + l)st generation; that is, in the generation which has

T-1

Then c = ( l:ct+l)/T. The level of
tcO
directly frCIII the par~
obtained
is
generation
youngest
cheating in the

already lived fort periods.

eters of the economy because the citizens in this generation have had no
exposure to the economic enviromDent.

In fact, fort= 0 and s(t) = 0,

14
expressions (2) and (5a) yield

where 11 (a 1 ) and 1 2.<a2) are the distribution functions of a1 and a2 re
spectively.

It is also being assumed here that the distribution of ini

tial beliefs (across

■ embers

of a cohort) is the same for all cohorts.

Next consider any one of the older 1enerations of citizens.

The

probability that a citizen chooses to ·cheat in the (t + l)st period of
his life is the same as the probability of (6) being satisfied.

Now

whether a citizen encounters a corrupt bureaucrat during any single
period is a Bernoulli trial with success probability C.

Thus the prob

ability of (6) being satisfied is same as the probability of s(t) or more
successes out oft Bernoulli trials where the probability of success in
each trial is C.

Accordingly. the probability of (6) being satisfied is

given by the Binomial distribution function14

(16)

By aggregating (16) over all

■embers

of the (t + l)st generation, we ob

tain the level of cheating in this aeneration:

Further, by aaaregating (15) and (17) across aenerations, we obtain the
economy-wide level of cheating.

That is

15
1T-l t+l
=f(C)
C!!TI,c

(18)

t=O

where f(C) is a short-hand expression for the function at the right hand
side of (18).
Steady-state Level of Corruption:

The derivation of the steady-

state level of corruption is quite similar to that above.

The details

are therefore omitted and only the relevant expressions are presented.
The level of corruption in the youngest generation of bureaucrats is

probability that a bureaucrat, whose initial beliefs are represented by

<A1, A2), would choose to be corrupt during the (t + l)st period of his
life is

(20)

B(R(t, U, M, ~•

A:2),

tM,

c) =

Therefore, the level of corruption in the (t + l)st aeneration is

Finally, the economy-wide level of corruption is obtained by aggregating
over (19) and (21):
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1T-l t+l

(22)

Cs-!:.C

Tt=O

=F(c)

where F(c) represents the function on the right hand side of (22).

The

above equation, in combination with (18), determines the steady-state
levels of cheating and corruption.

III.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF AGGllDATE

COIUWPTION AND CHEATING
The model developed above yields a number of insights; these are
slUIIJllarized in this section.

I begin with some important issues concern

ing the multiplicity and stability of equilibria.

It is then argued that

under plausible assumptions we should ezpect a diversity in individuals'
behavior rather than uniformity.

The final subsection is devoted to as

certaining the effects of changes in the parameters of the economy on
societal corruption and cheating.
A.

!!!!tiplicity and Stability of F.quilibria

Note from (18) and (22) that c is a polynomial in C, and C is a
polynomial inc.

Also, the highest possible order of each of these poly

nomials is T - 1.

Thus, unless there are special circumstances (for in

stance, the life span of individuals is too short; aay. Tc 2). it would
be the case that there are multiple equilibria.

Therefore. two economies

with identical set of parameters can have 1i1nificantly different levels
of corruption and cheating.

The reason for the multiplicity of equilib-
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ria is that the current behavior of individuals is explicitly influenced
by their past behaviors.

Therefore. the particular steady-state to which

an economy settles (when it does) is influenced by the history of the
economy preceding the steady-state. 15
In the analysis· below. we restrict our attention to only those equi
libria which are locally stable; this is because the economy does not
return to a locally unstable equilibri'DII after a small perturbation.

A

necessary condition for the local stability of an equilibrium defined by
(18) and (22) is

fr!

(23 )

C

(

1•

where a subscript off or F denotes the variable with respect to which a
partial derivative is being taken.

The stability condition (23) plays a

central role in the comparative dynamics analysis presented below. There
fore.

a

derivation of this stability condition is provided in Appendix I.

Also. it is obvious that our interest is limited to only those solu
tions of (18) and (22) for which both c and Care not smaller than zero
or larger than one.

This is because other values of c and C do not have

an economic meaning in the present context.
B.

Diversity versus Uniformity in Individuals' Behavior

Is a complete unifonnity in individuals' behavior (for instance. an
economy in which all bureaucrats are corrupt. or no bureaucrat is cor
rupt) a likely possibility?
no.

The analysis below shows that the answer is

That is, under plausible assumptions we should expect a diversity in

individuals' behavior.
Consider the possibility of an equilibrium in which no bureaucrat is

18

corrupt (that is, the "corner" equilibrium where C = 0).

Such an equi

librilllll obviously requites the youngest generations of bureaucrats to be
free of corruption.

Furthermore, this corner equilibrium is infeasible

if even a few members of the youngest generations of citizens are choos
This is because the arrival of these few citizens into the

ing to cheat.

economy in each period induces, aiven sufficiently long life span, at
least some bureaucrats (those who happen to encounter these citizens) to
believe that it is in their interest to be corrupt.

The corresponding

choice of these bureaucrats to be corrupt, in turn, leads to more citi
zens deciding to cheat in the future.

The resulting equilibrilllll must

therefore entail at least some cheating as well as some corruption.
A noteworthy aspect of the above argument is that it is effective
only if the life span of bureaucrats is not too brief.

If the life span

is too brief then it is possible that the behavioral externalities gener
ated by a small subset of individuals may die out before they have had an
opportunity to affect the economy's equilibrium.
Parallel reasoning suggests the infeasibility of other corner equi
libria; that is, of the equilibrium where all bureaucrats are corrupt,
and of the equilibria where all or none of the citizens choose to cheat.
These conclusions are 11mJDarized below. 16
If the life •Ean of individuals is not too brief then

PROPOSITION 3 •

... o.

(a)

C

>0

even i f cl

J!rOVided cl

> o.

(b)

C

<1

even if cl .. 1, J!rovided cl

< 1.

(c)

C

)

0 even if cl= 0, J!rOVided cl

> o.

(d)

C

<1

even i f cl = 1, Erovided cl

> o.
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Next, consider the polar case where there is complete absence of
corruption and cheating in the youngest generations (that is, cl= O and
c 1 = 0).

Then it is straightforward to verify that an equilibrium in

which there is no corruption or cheating in the economy is feasible; that
is, C = 0 and c = O.is a feasible solution of (18) and (22).

Yet there

is no economic reason to expect this particular corner equilibri11111 to be
necessarily stable.

On the contrary. examples can be constructed in

which such an equilibri11111 is not stable (that is, it does not satisfy the
condition (23)), particularly if the life span of individuals is not too
brief.

To see the reason, consider a slight perturbation of this corner

equilibrium which introduces a small number of corrupt bureaucrats in the
economy.

Then, given sufficient life span, these handful of bureaucrats

can initiate a chain reaction of behavioral externalities (inducing citi
zens to cheat and, in turn, inducing other bureaucrats to be corrupt) so
that the economy can not return to the same equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 4.

Thus

Some bureaucrats might be corrupt and some citizen might

choose to cheat even if the youngest generations of bureaucrats is free
gf_J:orruption and the youngest generations of citizens is free of
cheating.
Analogously, though the corner equilibrium in which all bureaucrats
are corrupt and all citizens cheat (that is, C = 1 and c = 1) is feasible
for certain sets of parameters (for which, cl= 1 and cl= 1), this corn
er equilibrium also may not be stable.
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C.

Effects of Economy's Parameters on Aggregate Corruption and

Cheating
The method for comparative dynamics analysis is as follows.
denote a parameter which affects the function fin (18), and let
a parameter which affects the function Fin (22).

Let e

e denote

That is, the equation

system

(24)

c = f(C, 8), and C = F(c, f)

defines the equilibrium values of c and C.

Then perturbing the above

equation system in the neighborhoo d of a locally stable equilibrium , and
using (23), it is easily ascertained that 17
(25)

sgn(dc/d8) = sgn(dC/d9) = sgn(f ), and
9

(26)

san(dc/dO) = sgn(dC/dO) = sgn(F ).
9

I now employ the above expressions to deteniine the effects of different
parameters on

a

societal equilibrium .

Effect of Changes in the Cost of Cheating and the Cost of Corrup
tion:

In many cases, a reduction in government interventio n reduces the

opportuniti es of corruption available to bureaucrats , which in turn would
increase the relative cost of corruption for an individual bureaucrat. 18
The consequence s of such a change in the relative cost on the societal
equilibrium are easily ascertained . If this change in incentives prevents
even a few of the bureaucrats from beina corrupt, as one would expect to
be the case, then the incidence of cheating would decline in the future
because the citizens would encounter fner corrupt bureaucrats .
this would reduce the future incidence of corruption.

In turn,

As a result of
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this chain reaction, the economy would settle to an equilibrium in which
the level of corruption as well as the level of cheating is lower.
To confirm the above intuition, recall from (14) that the reserva
tion score of any bureaucrat can not decrease if the relative cost of
corruption, U, is larger.
creases.

Also, from (20), B must decrease if R in

Now to avoid unnecessary details, I assume that if U is larger,

then the reservation score for at least one bureaucrat increases during
at least one period of his life.

Correspondingly, in the right hand side

of (22), Bis smaller for at least one set of (t,
and, from (26), dc/dU < 0 and dC/dU < O.

Ai,

,½).

Thus Fu< O

A similar analysis of the ef

fect of a change in the relative cost of cheating, u, shows that
de/du< 0 and dC/du < O. · We therefore obtain
PROPOSITION 5.

A larger relative cost of corruption or a larger relative

cost of cheating lowers the level of corruption as well as the level of
cheating.
Effect of Changes in Initial Beliefs:

The initial beliefs of a bur

eaucrat are represented in the present model by (A1 ,
cates, a bureaucrat with a larger

Ai

,½).

As (10) indi

or a smaller-½_ begins his life with

a larger estimate of the level of cheating in the economy. A first-order
stochastic improvement in the distribution of

Ai,

or a first-order stoc

hastic worsening in the distribution of¼, therefore represents that the
youngest generations of bureaucrats believe that there is a greater prev
alence of cheating in the economy. Likewise, a first-order stochastic
improvement in the distribution of a1 , or a first-order stochastic wors
ening in the distribution of a2 , represents that the youngest generations
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of citizens believe that there is a greater prevalence of corruption in
the economy.
Each of the preceding four stochastic changes have similar implica
tions.

Consider a first-order stochastic improvement in the distribution

Ai•

From (lla), .this means that the distribution of reservation levels

of

across bureaucrats shifts to the left.

Consequently, at least a few more

bureaucrats would be corrupt than what would have been the case in the
absence of the stochastic change.

This, in turn, sets up a chain reac

tion encouraging more citizens to cheat and more bureaucrats to be cor
rupt.

The new equilibrimn to which the economy would settle would thus

entail higher levels of corruption and cheating.
stochastic changes are traced similarly.

The effects of other

These results are summarized

bel01r, and a formal derivation is presented in Appendix 2.
PROPOSITION 6.

If the youngest generations of bureaucrats believe that

the level of cheating is higher in the economy, or if the youngest gener
ations of citizens believe that the level of corruption is higher in the
economy, then the actual level of corruption as well as the actual level
of cheating in the economy is higher.
Effect of Age on Different Generations' Behavior:

A difference be

tween an older and a younger aeneration is that the fonier has had more
opportunities to observe the economic enviro1111ent.

Our objective then is

to ascertain whether the levels of corruption and cheating are hiaher or
lower in older generations.
To explore an intuitive anner, consider a bureaucrat's behavior in
two successive periods.

If most of the citizens he has encountered in
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the last period had chosen to cheat (an event which is more likely to
occur if the level of cheating in the economy is higher). then this bur
eaucra twill revise upwards his estimate of the level of cheating in the
economy.

Correspondingly . the possibility of his being corrupt (rather

than not corrupt) during the current period would increase.

The preced

ing observation then suggests that the level of corruption in an older
generation of bureaucrats is likely to be higher, rather than lower, if
the level of cheating is higher.

This intuition is not entirely complete

however because bureaucrats' choices are also affected by the relative
cost of corruption (that is. a larger cost makes it less attractive to be
corrupt) and by their initial beliefs (for instance, a person with very
strongly held initial beliefs is less likely to alter his behavior with
time and experience).

To take into account all of these aspects. we ob
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tain the following result from an approximated version of (21):

(27)

sgn(aC

t+l

/at)= sgn(c - U),

if the youngest generations of bureaucrats are indifferent between being
corrupt or not corrupt.
The corresponding expression to ascertain the effect of age on the
level of cheating in different generations of citizens, obtained from an
approximated version of (17). is:

(28)

sgn(ac

t+l

/at)= s1n(C - u),

if the youngest generations of citizens are indifferent between cheating
and not cheating.

These results are s11111JDarized below.
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PROPOSITION 7.

An older generation of bureaucrats is more corrupt than

younger generations if the level of cheating in the economy is larger
than the relative cost of corruption, and if the youngest generations of
bureaucrats are indifferent between being corrupt or not corrupt.
02ously. an older generation of citizens cheats to

a

Anal-

greater extent than

younger generations if the level of corruption in the economy is larger
than the relative cost of cheating, and if the youngest generations of
ci thens are indifferent between cheating or not cheating.
Effects of Changes in the Life Span:

To look into the effects of a

change in the life span (from T to T + 1) on the societal equilibrium, we
obtain the following tw9 results from (18), (22), (25), and (26). 20
A longer life span of bureaucrats increases (decreases) c as

(29)

well as C, if the current cT is larger (smaller) than C.
A longer life span of citizens increases (decreases) c as well

(30)

as C, if the current cT is larger (smaller) than c.
I focus on the interpretation of (29); the interpretation of (30) is
similar.

The result (29) is intuitive because if the level of corruption

in the oldest generation is higher than the economy-wide level of corrup
tion, then the direct effect of a longer life span of bureaucrats is to
increase the econcay-wide level of corruption (because the oldest genera
tion gets to live for one more period, and it therefore increases the
average) and the indirect effect is to induce a areater extent of cheat
ing and corruption.

The new equilibrium. therefore entails a higher level

of corruption as well as a higher level of cheating in the economy.
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Next, recall that Proposition 7 provides a set of sufficient condi
tions for the monotonicit y of ct+l and ct+l ,rith respect to t.

We use

this proposition to obtain the following, easily understanda ble, result
for the case ,rhere the youngest generations of bureaucrats are indiffer
ent bet,reen being corrupt or not corrupt, and the youngest aenerations of
citizens are indifferent between cheating or not cheating.
PROPOSITION 8.

A longer life span of bureaucrats increases the level of

corruption as ,rell as the level of cheating if the current level of
cheating is larger than the relative cost of corruption.

Similarly. a

longer life span of citizens increases the level of corruption as ,rell as
the level of cheating if the current level of corruption is larger than
relative cost of cheating.
Effect of Changes in M:

We finally ascertain the effect of a change

in the number of citizens encountered by a bureaucrat during a single
period.

There are two effects of an increase in M, say from M to

(M + 1), on the behavior of a bureaucrat in the (t + l)st generation:
(i) his sample size increases by t because he no,, obtains one more obser
vation in each of the past M periods, and (ii) his reservation level in
creases because he now needs a greater evidence of cheating (that is, a
larger number of past encounters ,rith citizens who had chosen to cheat)
to be convinced that it is in his interest to be corrupt.
The overall effect of an increase in Mon the probabiliti es of dif
ferent bureaucrats being corrupt or not corrupt is therefore ambiguous,
as can be seen from (20).

It is intuitive however to expect that if the

current level of cheating is high (say, the current c is close to one)
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then a larger Mwould increase the probabilities of different bureaucrats
being corrupt.

This is because a larger M would make it more likely that

the increased reservation levels are satisfied. If this is the case. then
the level of corruption and cheating in the economy would increase.

On

the other hand. if ihe level of cheating is low (say. the current c is
close to zero) then one might expect that a larger K would reduce the
level of corruption and cheating.

The above intuition is supported. with

some qualifications. by the following result (for a proof. see Appendix
2).
PROPOSITION 9.

A larger M implies an increased (decreased) level of cor

ruption as well as an increased (decreased) level of cheating in the
economy if the current level of cheating is larger (smaller) than the
relative cost of corruption and if the youngest generations of bureau
crats are indifferent between being corrupt or not corrupt.

IV.

IIORE GENERAL IIODPLS

The simple model analyzed in preceding sections can be generalized
in a variety of ways.

In each case. there would be a concomitant change

in some of the details of the analysis but the qualitative issues which
we have emphasized would not be significantly affected.

S0111e of these

generalizations are briefly discussed in this section.
Heterogeneity in Individuals' Characteristics:

The only relevant

source of heterogeneity in individuals' characteristics in the preceding
model is that due to their initial beliefs.

To see how other kinds of

heterogeneity can be introduced. consider the case where the benefits to
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a citizen from alternative actions (that is, from cheating versus not
cheating) depend in part on his income.

Let the parameter a3 denote the

income of a citizen, and let his relative cost of cheating be represented
as u(a 3 ).

It is then straightfor,rard to characterize the societal equi

librium for any given distribution of incomes in the economy.

Further

more, intuitive results of the following kind are easily established:
a

ll

citizen's relative cost of cheating is decreasing in his income, then a

first-order stochastic improvement in the distribution of incomes results
in a higher level of corruption as wel1 as a higher level of cheating.
The effects of other types of heterogeneity (such as the heterogeneity in
individuals' tastes for cheating or corruption, and the heterogeneity in
their risk-aversion) can be assessed similarly.
Sources of an Individual's Learning:

The exogenous parameters rep

resenting the nature of an individual's learning can be given more gen
eral meaning than that in the preceding model.

For instance, the number

of citizens that a bureaucrat encounters during a period or the number of
bureaucrats a citizen encounters during a period may be stochastic rather
than fixed parameters.

Other sources of learning can also be included in

the analysis (for instance, interaction with one's peers) but in doing so
one needs to take into account the direct costs of such learnina as well
as the indirect costs of potential miscommunication.

At yet another

level of generalization, the nature of an individual's learning may in
part be influenced by his own choices; for instance, whether a citi&en
encounters a bureaucrat in a particular period (or how many bureaucrats
he encounters) is partly a matter of the citizen's own choice which is,
in turn, detemined by his beliefs and by the pecuniary trade-offs he
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faces.

In each case. the basic feature of the analysis would remain siar

ilar to that in preceding sections.
A Bureaucrat's Trade-offs:

The simple reduced-form representation

of a bureaucrat's trade-offs which was employed in preceding sections is:
a

bureaucrat's choice is binary (to be corrupt or not corrupt) and his

aains from being corrupt are linearly increasing in the number of citi
zens who are cheating.

To generalize this specification. consider the

following two steps.
First, let a bureaucrat's choice remain binary. which would be the
case if the probability of convicting a corrupt bureaucrat and the pun
ishment imposed upon a corrupt bureaucrat are not significantly different
whether he is corrupt with respect to one or more than one citizen. Also.
recalling the notations defined earlier, let V(b) = uO(b) - u1 denote the
difference between a bureaucrat's ex-post utilities from being corrupt
versus being not corrupt.

Then, for a wide range of transactions between

bureaucrats and citizens, we would expect V(b) to be increasing in b, but
not always linearly as was assumed in preceding sections.

Further, if

the ex-ante (expected) value of V(b) is represented as V(S(t), t, M, A),
then we would expect

V to be increasing in S(t). That is, the ex-ante

utility from being corrupt (rather than not corrupt) would be higher for
a bureaucrat if he has encountered a larger number of citizens who are
cheating.
and only if

Now, since a bureaucrat's rational choice is to be corrupt if

V LO, it is easily verified that this choice can be repre

sented by a criterion such as (12).

The corresponding societal equilib

rium is accordingly characterized.
Next, consider an illustration of those situations where a bureau-

29

crat can be partially corrupt.

Let a denote the fraction of citizens to

whom a bureaucrat offers corruption as a basis for transaction, where
these offers are accepted by the citizens who have chosen to cheat.

The

ex-ante utility in this case can be represented in a reduced form as
V(S(t), t, M, A, a), where the bureaucrat chooses a to maximize this ex
ante utility.

It would then be the case for a wide variety of circwn

stances that the optimal a, denoted by a•(S(t), t, M, A), is increasing
in S{t).

That is, the extent of partial corruption currently chosen by a

bureaucrat is higher if he has encountered in the past a larger n1111ber of
citizens who are cheating.

Once again, then, it can be shown that the

behavioral externalities exerted by individuals on one another and the
resulting societal equilibrium has qualitative properties similar to
those analyzed earlier.
Finally, for simplicity, I have assumed thus far that an individ
ual's relative pay-offs (specifically, the relative cost of cheating to a
citizen and the relative cost of corruption to a bureaucrat) are not
affected by the levels of cheating and corruption in the economy.

On the

other hand, we would in general expect changes in the societal environ
ment to influence the kinds of economic activities which individuals do
or do not undertake.

A simple example is the possibility that a higher

level of corruption lowers the amounts of bribes which a corrupt bureau
crat can potentially extract, and this in turn reduces the attractiveness
of corruption to a bureaucrat.

Such aodifications alter some of the de

tails of the analysis (for instance the extreme riaht hand aide of (22)
will now be a function of c as well as C) but not its nature.
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V.

CONQ.UDING REMARl:S

This paper has developed an economic model to analyze the evolution
and the perpetuation of bureaucratic corruption, and to identify ho,r such
processes mi1ht be related to the characteristics of the economy.

I con

clude the paper with remarks highlighting some of the central features of
the analysis presented earlier.

These remarks also 11J1derscore some of

the limitations of the analysis which have not been previously noted.
The basic source of dynamics in our analysis is that an individual's
past experiences of dealing with the economic environment provide him
with inference and partial knowledge concerning the enviromnent which he
21 . Th e econom1c
. curren tl y f ac1ng.
.
· env1romnents
·
·
1s
·
o f prev1ous
per1ods
(which are themselves aggregations of how individuals had chosen to be
have in those respective periods), therefore, affect individuals' ration

al choices in the current period.

The resulting economic enviromnent of

the current period, in turn, influences the economic environments of
future periods.

It is apparent that such a dynamics is relevant not only

to the phenomenon of bureaucratic corruption but also to those other
aspects of human behavior where past experiences influence current eco
nomic choices. 22
An advanta1e of an explicit historical process of the kind described

above is that one can, in principle, study the pattern of evolution of
the economy. For instance, 1iven a set of initial conditions, and a set
of rand011 shocks to which the economy might be subject, it is possible to
calculate the probabilities of different patterns of bureaucratic corrup
tion throu1h which the economy

■ iaht

evolve over time.

Depend~ng on the

underlying parameters, such a model can predict patterns consistent with
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rapid changes in societal behavior (for instance, cases where a set of
shocks lead the economy rapidly into hyper-corruption) as well as pat
terns which are consistent with a relative lack of change in societal
behavior (for instance, cases in which the effects of temporary reforms
in the salary or the policing structure of bureaucrats die out, given the
forces of persistence, before they have had an opportunity to affect the
level of corruption which will be sustained in the economy).
For brevity. I have not analyzed this kind of dynamics in the pres
ent paper.

Instead, I have focused on those steady-states of the economy

in which. in the absence of external shocks, certain features of the
economy (specifically, the level of cheating and the level of corruption
in the economy) do not change from period to period.

I have then anal

yzed these steady-states (which, in general, are multiple) to derive a
number of qualitative results; in particular. a result showing that the
economy-wide extremes of corruption and cheating might be unlikely. and
several results identifying the effects of the economy's parameters on
the steady-state levels of corruption and cheating.
Moreover, the historical process described earlier allows us. once
again. to be explicit about how different steady-states might be reached

by the economy. 23

For instance, two economies with identical underlying

parameters may reach two different steady-states if their initial condi
tions were different, or if they had faced different kinds of shocks in
• the past, or if they had faced similar shocks but at different times in
the past.

In any event, once the patterns of econoaic environment in

these two otherwise identical economies beain to diverge, there is no
natural force in these economies to reduce and eliminate these
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differences.
Finally. an important aspect of our analysis is that it applies to
economies with a variety of leaal. political and administrative struc
tures.

A primary role of these structures is to influence the nature of

pecuniary trade-offs faced by individuals (for instance. the relative
cost of corruption faced by a bureaucrat, and the relative coat of cheat
ing faced by a citizen).

Obviously, therefore, these structures affect

the precise dynamic path of corruption and cheating in the economy as
well as the precise steady-state to which the economy •iaht settle.

Yet.

no matter what the nature of leaal and bureaucratic structure might be.
the positive analysis on which we have focused remains unaffected so long
as an individual's choice is partly a consequence of what his beliefs are
concerning the nature of the environment he faces. and so long as these
beliefs are influenced by the individual's past experiences of dealicg
with the environment.
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APPENDIX 1

The purpose of this Appendix is to demonstra te that (23) is a neces
sary condition for the local stability of the equation system (18) and
(22).

To do this. I begin with a dynamic model of which a special case

is the equation system (18) and (22).
denote different periods.

It is clear from the

model described in the text (Section I.D) that the level of cheating in
the current period depends on the levels of corruptio n in previous T - 1
periods.

This dependenc e can be represent ed in general as

(Al)

c(~)

= z(C(~ - 1) •••.• C(~ - T + 1)).

Likewise, the level of corruptio n can be represent ed in general as
(A2)

C(~) = Z(c(~ - 1), •.. , c(~ - T + 1)).

A special case of the above equation system, reckoned at a steady-st ate,

is the equation system (18) and (22).
Let z.J denote the partial derivativ e of z with respect to its jth
argument in (Al). and let Zj denote the partial derivat,J.v e of Z with respect to its jth argument in (A2).
ing.

This Appendix establish es the follow
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PROPOSITION 10.

A necessary condition for the local stability of the

difference equation system (Al) and (A2) is
T-1

T-1

( [z.)( '[Z.)
j=l J j=l J

(A3)

< 1.

The reason why this proposition is central to our purpose is that if
this proposition holds then it is evident that

(23)

is a necessary condi

tion for the stability of the steady-state equilibri11111 defined by (18)
and

(22).

My strategy for proving Proposition 10 is as follows.

Rather than

to provide a direct proof, I first transform the system (Al) and (A2)
into another system in which the current c is a function of past e's, and
the current C is a function of past C's.

I then show that (A3) is a

necessary condition for the stability of the transformed system.

This

proof is presented in three steps.
Step 1:

Substituting (A2) into (Al), the current c can be expressed

as a function of past values of e's.
(A4)

In particular

c(~) = z(Z(c(~ - 2), •••• c(~ - T)), ••••
Z(c(~ - T), ••• , c(~ - 2T + 2)),

which can be reexpre11ed, in turn, in a reduced fora as
(AS)

c(~) = z(c(~ - 2), •••• c(~ - 2T + 2)).

In the above expression, let ac(~)/acc~ is easily shown that

■)

be denoted as em·

Then it
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(A6)

T-1

T-1

2T-2
:re

rz.).

= ( ,rz.)(
j=l J j=l J
m=2 m

This is because, from (A4) and (AS),

acc-r _

2t-2 T-1

2T-2

(A7)

re=

m=2 m

r LZ·ac
c 't

m=2 j=l J

i2

)"

- m

Next note from (A2) that

(AS)

C ( "t
aac('t

- j)
- m)

+ T - 1 L m L j + 1, and

=Z

if

=0

otherwise.

.
m-J

j

T-1

Usin& (AS), the right hand side of (A7) becomes

j+T-1

!: z. L Z . •
j=l Jm=j+l m-J

A re-

arrangement of the subscripts in the preceding expression allows (A7) to
be rewritten as (A6).
Using an analogous reasoning, the current value of C can be express
ed as a function of the past C's.
(A9)

That is

C("t) = Z(C("t - 2), ••• , C('t - 2T + 2));

and if ac(-r)/aC(-r - m) is denoted as Em, then it is easily established
that
T-1
·T-1
[ Z . ).
)(
zj
I:
(
:! E =
j=l J
j=l
m=2 m

2T-2
(AlO)
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I now show that a necessary condition for the local stabil-

Step 2:
ity of (AS) is
2T-2
(All)

re

m=2 m

< 1.

To show this, I use a standard technique of converting the difference
equation (AS), which is of order 2T - 2, into a system of first-order
Define x 1 (~)

difference equations.
j

E

c(~). and xJ(~)

= 2 to 2T- 2. Define the column ve·ctor x(~)

e

E

xj-l(~ - 1) for

[xl(~) •••• , x2T- 2 (~)].

Then equation (AS) can be equivalently expressed as the vector equation
(Al2)

x(~) = X(x(~ - 1)),

where the derivatives of X with respect to x(~ - 1) are represented by
the companion matrix

0

(Al3)

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

A necessary and sufficient condition for (AS) to be stable is that the
magnitude of every ei1envalue of (Al3) should be uaaller than one (for a
proof of this result, see Hirsch and Smale, 1974, pp. 280-81).
To see that (All) is necessary for the stability of (AS), note that
the characteristic polynomial of matrix (Al3) is
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(A14)

PO.)

where A denotes an eigenvalue of matrix (A13).
not hold.

Then (Al4) shows that P(l)

i

1.

Now suppose (All) does

This violates one of the

Schur-Cohn criteria for the roots of the polynomial (A14) to have magni
tudes smaller than one (see LaSalle. 1986, p. 27, for a description of
these standard criteria).

Therefore, (All) is necessary for the stabil-

ity of (AS).
2T-2

[E',n < 1 is a necessary condition for the
m=2
stability of (A9) is identical to that in Step 2. From (A6) and (AlO},
Step 3:

The proof that

therefore, (A3) is a necessary condition for the stability of (AS) and
(A9).

But then (AS) and (A9} are transformed versions of (Al) and (A2}.

Therefore (A3) is a necessary condition for the stability of the system
(Al) and (A2).

This completes the proof of Proposition 10.

38

APPENDIX 2

Proof of Proposition 6:

Let the distribution function of

Ai

be de

noted by G1 (A1 • f) auch that a larger value of the paraaeter fl signifies
a first-order stochastic iaproveaent .

That ia:

aG1 /afl

strict inequality holds for at least s011e values of
end-points of the distributio n of

Ai

are fixed.

Ai•

i o. where the
and where the

Froa (22) and fr011 a

standard result on stochastic dominance. then F > 0 if: dB/dA 10 and
1
0
the strict inequality holds for at least some values oft. and for soae
values of
that:

Ai

where clJ 1 /dfl

dR/dA1

~

o.

< O.

and dB/dR

Next. note from (lla). (llb) and (20)

< O.

Also. to avoid unneceuary details. I

assume that dR/dA.i is strictly negative for some values oft, and for
some values of

Ai

where cE 1 /d0 is strictly negative.

Therefore Ffl

> o.

and the result concerning the effect of a change in fl on C and c follows
from (26).

Analogous proofs apply for the results concerning the sto

chastic changes in the distributio ns of

"2•

a1 and a2 •

Derivation of E.Jpressions (27) and (28):

If t ia treated as a con

tinuous variable, then the distinction between the reservation level and
reservation score (that ia between Rand R) can be ignored.

Next,

a

normal approxiaati on of the binomial distribution function (20) is:

(Al5)

B • 1 - N[(R
- tKc){tKc(l - c)) -1/2 ].

where Ria 1iven by (lla) and N[] represents the distributio n function
for the unit normal variate.

The derivative of B with respect tot. from

(Al5), can be rearranged to yield:
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(Al6)

sgn(dB/dt) = sgn[tM(c - U) + A•].

where A•~ (A1 + Az)U - A1 denotes the initial·reservation level.

Now

from the definition of A• and from (8) and (lla) it follows that the
yoUJ1.gest 1enerations of bureaucrats are indifferent between being corrupt
or. not corrupt if A• :: O.
and (21).

The result (27) then is obtained from (Al6)

The derivation of (28) follows similar lines.

Proof of Proposition 9:

Treating Has a continuous variable and

using the approximation (A15), one obtdns
sgn(dB/dM) = sgn[tH(c - U) + A•],

(Al 7)

where A• represents (as before) the initial reservation level.
fore:

dB/dM ( 0 if c t U, and A• z O.

(22) and (26).

There

The proposition follows by using
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FOOINOTES
1.

See Lewis (1955, Chs. III and VII) for a pioneeri ng discussi on.

For

related llarxist views, see Melotti (1977).
2.

Dynamic behavio ral externa lities of the kind describe d here may play
a fundame ntal economi c role in detei:min ing other societal phenomena

as well.

But, as one would expect, the motivat ion of the analysis

as well as the formali zation would be quite differen t dependin g on
what is being studied.

See

my

1985 and 1987 papers respecti vely for

analyses of societal honesty and of criminal behavio r.

It should

also be noted here that several earlier research ers have alluded to
the idea of sequent ial causatio n between individ uals' beliefs and
economic behavio r.

Pareto's (1916) discussi on is one of the earli

est; for a summary of some of the views of Pareto, see Samuels
(1974, pp. 111-123 ).
3.

An example in a related but differen t context is the Gallup Poll on

how citizens rate the honesty and ethical standard s of local politi
cal officeho lders in the United States [see, Gallup (1976-8 6)]. This
survey, which has now been repeated for several years, shows sub
stantial variance in the cross-se ction of response s, and this vari
ance remains substan tial even among respond ents who are homogeneous
with respect to charact eristics such as income, occupati on, race and
sex [see, Vol. 2 (1972-7 6), pp. 823-850 ].

I am not aware of a

routinel y conducte d survey of how citizens in an LDC rate the extent
of bureauc ratic corrupti on, but I expect that signific ant variance
in response s would be observed in such a survey.
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4.

For an analysis of how legal and administrative structure arid sanc
tions influence a bureaucrat's incentive to be corrupt. see Rose
Ackerman (1978).

For a descriptive taxonomy of bribery. see Reisman

(1979).
5.

I do not however consider the case in which infinite punishment is
imposed on a corrupt bureaucrat (with s0111e probability of convic
tion) because such practices are not typically observed.

Whether

the absence of such punishments is due to the costs of erroneous
conviction or due to other reasons is not a relevant issue for the
present positive analysis.
6.

The distribution of. initial beliefs across individuals is assumed to
be an exogenously specified feature of the economy.

I do not go

into the origins of initial beliefs.
7.

These pay-offs can be further specialized to the case where a citi
zen who does not cheat obtains the same utility whether he encount
ers a corrupt or a not corrupt bureaucrat.

That is. u10 = u11 •

But

this special case may not represent the oft-observed situations in
which a corrupt bureaucrat extorts resources from even those citi
zens who have not cheated.
8.

To derive (1). note that the utility from cheating is
cu 00 + (1

C)u 01 and the utility fr0111 not cheating is

cu 10 + (1

C)u 11 •

is satisfied.

The former is

DO

aialler than the latter if (1)

For simplicity, it is ass'lllled in (1) that an individ

ual chooses to cheat if he is indifferent between cheating and not
cheating.

The analysis remains unchanged if the opposite assumption
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is made.
9.

The derivation of (3) is as follows.
probability density which

a

Let dh(e; a1 , a2 ) denote the

citizen associates in the beginning of

life with the level of corruption e, where 1

Le L 0, and where

h( a; a1 , a2 ) is the distribution function for be ta distribution
parameters a1 and a2 •

,r ith

Now, whether or not this citizen encounters a

corrupt bureaucrat during any single period can be viewed as the
outcome of a Bernoulli trial.

Therefore, using a standard result in

Bayesian statistics (see, Rao, 1973, p. 335), the posterior beliefs
of a citizen ,rho has encountered s(t) corrupt bureaucrats during the
past t periods can be represented by the distribution function
h(e; a1 + s(t), a2 + t - s(t)).

The mean estimate of the level of

corruption is then /edh(e; a1 + s(t), a2 + t - s(t)) which equals
(a 1 + s(t))/(a 1 + a2 + t).

10.

Once again, this assumption is not only reasonable but it also
allows us to abstract from those cases where a bureaucrat's choice
is entirely insensitive to his beliefs.

11.

The proof is as follows.
s(t)

~

From (2) and (5a),

(a 1 + a2 + t)u - a1 for a citizen who had chosen to cheat in

the last period.

Also, s(t+l)

s

s(t) + 1 if this citizen encount

ered a corrupt bureaucrat in the last period.
ceding two ezpressions yield:

Since 1

> u,

the pre

1(t+l) >(al+ a2 + t + l)u - a1.

From (2) and (5a), therefore, this citizen chooses to cheat in the
current period as well.
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12.

Let the parameters~ and~ denote the initial beliefs of two bur
eaucrats represented by j = 1, 2.

Now suppose bureaucrat 1 is ini-.

tially corrupt and bureaucrat 2 is not.
t

=

S(t)

L_[ CA} +

=0

into (8) and (lla) yields:

A½> U -- A}l.

Then substitution of

>0

[(.\i + ~)U - Ai]

Adding tJIU to all terms in the preceding

expression and using (lla) and (llb) one obtains the result:
R(t, U, M,

At, Aj)

l

R(t, U, M,

A}, A½>.

An analogous result holds

concerning the effects of initial beliefs of different citizens on
their reservat"ion scores.

13.

Such a steady-state is a stylized depiction of the economy and, as
will become evident, the main value of this depiction is that it
helps us study the properties of the econOIIIY.

In reality, an ecoir

omy need not arrive at such a steady-state, specially if the dynamic
path of the economy is subject to perturbations by random influ
ences.

See Samuelson (1979, Ch. XI) for an extensive discussion of

these issues.

14.

The function B(r, t, C), which is used extensively below, is assumed
to possess the following conventional properties.
then:

If l

> C > O,

(i) Bis given by the right hand aide of (16) if t

(ii) B = 1 if r
B = 1 if r

i

i

0, and (iii) B = 0 if r

0, and B = 0 if r

r i t , and B = 0 if r
If t = 0, then:

> t.

B = 1 if r

> O.

> t.

l

r

If C = 0, then:

If C • 1, then:

B = 1 if

The above properties a11ume that t

i

0, and B = 0 if r

> 0,

> O.

> O.

Using the la1t

set of properties and the expre11ion1 (1) and (4), it can be veri
fied that (15) is a special case of (17), to be derived below, when
t =

o.
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15.

As we had indicated earlier, this paper abstracts from normative or
welfare analysis.

It might be useful to note, however, that differ

ent steady-states are in general not comparable on the Pareto basis.
Moreover, even if a stronger criterion (such as a social welfare
function) for comparison across steady-states were to be employed,
the present aodel does not support any reason to believe that the
economy would arrive at the 'optimal' 1teady-1tate.

The last con

clusion is analogous to that of Field (1981) and Basu et al. (1987)
in the context of social customs.
16.

To establish part (a), note from (22) and from the properties of the
function B described in footnote 14 that:
if R(t, U, M,

Ai,

A2 ) > tM for all t > O.

this can happen only if i(t) = (A1 +
t > O.

"2

if cl= O then C = O only
From (lla) and (llb),

+ tM)U - A1 > tM for all

But since i(t) - tM is linearly decreasing int, the preced

ing condition can not be satisfied if tis sufficiently large. The
proofs of other parts of Proposition 3 are similar.
17.

To establish the si1n of dC/d0 in (25), it is also required that
fc > O.

But the latter condition is automatically satisfied from

the definition off in (18).

Similarly, the si1n of dc/dO in (26)

requires that Fe> O, which ia satisfied by the definition of Fin
(22).

It ia a1111aed throu1hout that the values of c and Care in

the interior; that ia, they are lar1er than zero but aaller than
one.
18.

A chan1e in the extent and the nature of 1ovenment intervention may
also alter the patterns of interactions between citizens and bureau
crats.

The effects of such changes are analyzed below.
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19.

For

a

derivation of expression (27), and of expression (28) below,

see Appendix 2.
20.

To obtain (29), denote the function Fin (22) as F(c, T).

Expres

sion (26) then indicates that an increase in T, from T to T + 1, in
creases c as well as C if F(c, T + 1) - F(c, T) is positive.

The

result (29} then follows by recalling from (22) that
T-1

F(c, T) =

r::ct+l/T.
t=O
(18) and (25).

21.

The result (30) is obtained similarly from

While the present paper is based on a model of Bayesian learning,
this aspect is not essential.

Similar analysis applies with other

kinds of systematic. learning.

For instance, the qualitative fea

tures of the analysis remain Ullaltered so long as a citizen who has
encountered a larger number of corrupt bureaucrats in the past be
lieves that the probability of encountering a corrupt bureaucrat in
the current period is larger.
22.

Note also that these intertemporal learning externalities are quite
different (but not mutually exclusive) from some other economic
forces which have been viewed in the literature as sources of spe
cific types of societal behavior.

Particularly important are the

analyses in which reputation, sanctions and other strategic aspects
of an individual'• behavior are central; see Akerlof (1976, 1980).
23.

Such an explicit process should be contrasted with some other con
texts where multiple equilibria have been eaphaaized but where the
historical process bringing the economy to one or the other equilib
rilllll is implicit or unspecified.

See Schellin& (1978, Ch. 7) in the
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context of models of norms, and Diamond (1987) in the context of
models of credit market.
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